Automated Symbolic Analysis of ARBAC-Policies (Extended Version) by Armando, A. & Ranise, S.
Automated Symbolic Analysis of
ARBAC-Policies
(Extended Version)
Alessandro Armando1,2 and Silvio Ranise2
1 DIST, Universita` degli Studi di Genova, Italia
2 Security and Trust Unit, FBK, Trento, Italia
Abstract. One of the most widespread framework for the management
of access-control policies is Administrative Role Based Access Control
(ARBAC). Several automated analysis techniques have been proposed
to help maintaining desirable security properties of ARBAC policies.
One limitation of many available techniques is that the sets of users and
roles are bounded. In this paper, we propose a symbolic framework to
overcome this difficulty. We design an automated security analysis tech-
nique, parametric in the number of users and roles, by adapting recent
methods for model checking infinite state systems that use first-order
logic and state-of-the-art theorem proving techniques. Preliminary exper-
iments with a prototype implementations seem to confirm the scalability
of our technique.
1 Introduction
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [20] regulates access by assigning users to
roles which, in turn, are granted permissions to perform certain operations. Ad-
ministrative RBAC (ARBAC) [11] specifies how RBAC policies may be changed
by administrators; thus providing support for decentralized policy administra-
tion, which is crucial in large distributed systems. For the sake of simplicity, we
consider the URA97 component of ARBAC97 [19], which is concerned with the
management of the user-role assignment by administrative roles. The general-
ization to other variants of ARBAC is left to future work.
As it is almost impossible for a human to foresee the subtle interplays be-
tween the operations carried out by different administrators because of the large
number of possible interleavings. Automated analysis techniques are thus of
paramount importance to maintain desirable security properties while ensuring
flexible administration. Several techniques have been proposed, e.g., [17, 23, 22].
In general, security analysis problems are undecidable but become decidable un-
der suitable restrictions. Indeed, the results of the analysis are valid under the
assumptions that make them decidable. In this respect, one of the most severe
limitations of the available techniques is that the number of users and roles is
bounded, i.e. finite and known a priori. So, if one has proved that a certain prop-
erty holds for, say, 1000 users and 150 roles and after some times, the number of
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users or roles is changed for some reason, then the result of the previous analysis
no more holds and the automated technique must be invoked again. It would be
desirable to have analysis techniques capable of certifying that a certain property
holds regardless of the number of users or roles so to make their results more
useful.
In this paper, we propose a symbolic framework to specify ARBAC policies
that enables the design of parametric (in the number of users and roles) security
analysis techniques. The idea is to adapt recent techniques for model checking
infinite state systems [14] that use decidable fragments of first-order logic and
state-of-the-art theorem proving techniques to mechanize the analysis. The pa-
per makes two contributions towards the goal of building parametric analysis
techniques for ARBAC policies. The former is a framework for the uniform
specification of a variety of ARBAC policies. In particular, we can describe
security analysis problems where users and roles are finitely many but their exact
number is not known a priori. The second contribution is a symbolic backward
reachability procedure that can be used to solve an important class of se-
curity analysis problems, called user-role reachability problems, that allow
one to check if certain users can acquire a given permission or, dually, if a user
can never be given a role which would give him or her a permission which is not
supposed to have. The security analysis problem is iteratively reduced to a series
of satisfiability checks in a decidable fragment of first-order logic. We use ideas
from model theory and the theory of well-quasi-ordering [14, 5] for the proof
of termination of the method, which turns out to be the most substantial part
of the proof of correctness. The decidability of the parametric goal reachability
problem is obtained as a corollary of the correctness of the procedure.
Our decidability result is more general that those in [17, 23] which assume
a bounded number of users and roles. A comparison with the result in [22] is
more articulated. On the one hand, we are more general in allowing for a finite
but unknown number of users and roles while in [22] the users are bounded and
only the roles are parametric. On the other hand, we allow for only a restricted
form of negation in the preconditions of certain administrative actions while [22]
seems to allow for arbitrary negation. We plan to investigate how to extend our
framework to allow for arbitrary negation in the near future while in this paper
we focus on the core ideas. Finally, our procedure can consider several initial
RBAC policies at the same time while [17, 23, 22] can handle only one.
Plan of the paper. In Section 2, we formally define ARBAC policies with their
user-role reachability problem. In Section 3, we present our symbolic framework
for the specification of ARBAC polices. In Section 4, we design a symbolic anal-
ysis procedures of ARBAC policies. In Section 5, we discuss some preliminary
experiments with a prototype of our technique. Section 6 concludes and gives
some hints about future work. The omitted proofs and some additional material
can be found in the extended version of the paper [7].
2 RBAC and ARBAC policies
We assume familiarity with ARBAC (see, e.g., [11]) and many-sorted first-order
logic with equality (see, e.g., [13]). Consider a signature ΣARBAC containing
the sort symbols User ,Role, and Permission, countably many constant symbols
eui , e
r
i , e
p
i (for i ≥ 0) of sort User , Role, and Permission, respectively, the predi-
cate symbols (written infix), pa, and ua of arity Role×Role, Role×Permission,
and User×Role, respectively, and no function symbols. A RBAC policy is a first-
order structure M = (D, I) over this signature, where the interpretation of ua
(in symbols, uaI) is the user-role assignment relation, paI is the permission-role
assignment, and I is the role hierarchy. Without loss of generality, we consider
structures that interpret the sort symbols into (disjoint) sets of users, roles, and
permissions, respectively. Our notion of state corresponds to that of miniRBAC
policy in [23].
An ARBAC policy prescribes how the user-role assignment, the permission
assignment, and the role hierarchy of RBAC policies may evolve. As in [23] and
according to the URA97 administrative control model [19], in this paper, we
assume that the interpretations of  and pa are constant over time and only
that of ua may change. We also assume that I is a partial order and refer to
I as the ‘more senior than’ relationship between roles. We abuse notation by
denoting an interpretation M = (D, I) over ΣARBAC with the restriction s of
I to ua when the rest of M is clear from the context and write , pa, and ua
instead of I , paI , and uaI (or s(ua)), respectively.
Let s be a RBAC policy. A user u is an explicit member of a role r in
s if (u, r) ∈ s(ua) or, equivalently, s |= ua(u, r), where ‘|=’ is the standard
satisfaction relation of many-sorted first-order logic. Similarly, u is an implicit
member of r in s if (u, r′) ∈ s(ua) for some r′ which is more senior than r or,
equivalently, s |= ua∗(u, r) where ua∗(u, r) abbreviates the formula ∃r′.(r′ 
r ∧ ua(u, r′)). Thus, u is not a member of r (neither implicit nor explicit) if
for all role r′ more senior than r, we have (u, r′) 6∈ s(ua) or, equivalently, s |=
∀r′.(r′  r ⇒ ¬ua(u, r′)).
A can assign action is a tuple 〈ra, C, r′〉 such that ra, r′ are roles and C is a
(possibly empty) finite set of role expressions of the form r or r where r is a role.
Sometimes, along the lines of [17], a set T of users can be attached to a can assign
action; in this case, users in T are assumed not to initiate any role assignment.
A can revoke action is a pair 〈ra, r′〉 such that ra, r are roles. A user u satisfies
a role expression ρ in a RBAC policy s if u is an implicit member of role r in s
when ρ is r (or, equivalently, s |= ua∗(u, r)) and u is not a member of role r in
s when ρ is r (or, equivalently, s |= ¬ua∗(u, r)). A user u satisfies the finite set
C = {ρ1, ..., ρn} of role expressions in a RBAC policy s if u satisfies ρi in s, for
each i = 1, ..., n (n ≥ 0) or, equivalently, s |= [¬]ua∗(u, r1) ∧ · · · ∧ [¬]ua∗(u, rn),
where [¬]ua∗(u, ri) denotes ua∗(u, ri) when ρi is ri and ¬ua∗(u, ri) when ρi is
ri. If n = 0, then C = ∅ and any user u always satisfies it. Let s, s′ be two RBAC
policies. A can assign action 〈ra, C, r′〉 is enabled in s if there exist users ua, u
such that ua satisfies ra in s and u satisfies C in s and s
′ is obtained from s by its
application if s′(ua) = s(ua)∪{(u, r′)}. A can revoke action 〈ra, r′〉 is enabled in
s if there exists a user ua such that ua satisfies ra in s and s
′ is obtained from s
by its application if s′(ua) = s(ua)\{(u, r′)}. If α is a can assign or a can revoke
action, we write α(s, s′) to denote the fact that the action is enabled in s and s′
is obtained from s by applying α. The pair (S0, A) is an ARBAC policy when S0
is a finite set of RBAC policies, called initial, and A is a finite set of can assign
and can revoke actions. Let u be a user, RP be a finite set of pairs (r, p) where
r is a role and p a permission. The pair γ := (u,RP ) is called the goal of the
user-role reachability problem for Γ := (S0, A) which consists of answering the
following question: is there a sequence s0, ..., sm of states such that s0 ∈ S0, for
each i = 0, ...,m − 1, there exists α ∈ A for which α(si, si+1), (u, r) ∈ sm(ua),
and (r, p) ∈ pa for each pair (r, p) ∈ RP . If there is no such m ≥ 0, then the goal
γ is unreachable; otherwise, it is reachable and the sequence s0, ..., sm of states
is called a run leading Γ from an initial RBAC policy s0 ∈ S0 to a RBAC policy
satisfying γ.
Example 1. We formalize the running example in [17]. LetM be an RBAC pol-
icy such that User := {Alice,Bob, Carol}, Permission := {Edit, Access, V iew},
and Role := {Employee, Engineer, PartT ime, FullT ime,HumanResource,
ProjectLead, andManager}.3 Every user is a member of role Employee. Man-
agers work full-time. Project leaders are engineers. Alice is an engineer who is
part-time. All employees have access permission to the office. Thus, M is also
such that := {(Engineer,Employee), (PartT ime,Employee), (FullT ime,
Employee), (ProjectLead,Engineer), (Manager, FullT ime)}, pa := {(Access,
Employee), (V iew,HumanResource), (Edit, Engineer)}, ua := {(Alice, Part-
Time), (Alice, Engineer), (Bob,Manager), (Carol,HumanResource)}.
Examples of can assign are: 〈Manager, {Engineer, FullT ime}, P rojectLead〉,
〈HumanResource, ∅, FullT ime〉, and 〈HumanResource, ∅, PartT ime〉. The
meaning of the first action is that a manager can assign a full-time engineer
to be a project leader; the second and the third ones mean that a user in the
human-resources department can turn any user to be full-time or part-time. If
we attach to the previous assignments, the singleton set T = {Carol} of users;
then those actions cannot be performed by Carol even if she has the appropriate
roles. Examples of can revoke actions are: 〈Manager, ProjectLead〉, 〈Manager,
Engineer〉, 〈HumanResource, FullT ime〉, and 〈HumanResource, PartT ime〉.
For instance, the meaning of the first is that a manager can revoke the role of
project leader to any user; the meaning of the other actions is similar. uunionsq
3 Symbolic representation of ARBAC policies
Our framework represents (i) sets of RBAC policies as the models of a first-
order theory whose signature contains only constant and predicate symbols but
3 For the sake of clarity, here and the other examples of the paper, we will abuse
notation by using more evocative names for constants than eαi , α ∈ {u, r, p} (i ≥ 0).
Also, if constants have different identifiers, then they denote distinct elements. We
use the same identifiers to denote constants and the elements they denote.
no function symbols, (ii) initial RBAC policies and constraints as universal for-
mulae, and goals of reachability problems as existential formulae, and (iii) ad-
ministrative actions (such as the can assign and can revoke) as certain classes of
formulae. The assumptions on the three components allow us to design a deci-
sion procedure for the user-role reachability problem where the number of users
and roles is finite but unknown. We now describe in details these assumptions.
Formal preliminaries. A Σ-theory is a set of sentences (i.e. formulae where
no free variables occur) over the signature Σ. A theory T is axiomatized by
a set Ax of sentences if every sentence ϕ in T is a logical consequence of Ax.
We associate with T the class Mod(T ) of structures over Σ which are models
of the sentences in T . A theory is consistent if Mod(T ) 6= ∅. A Σ-formula ϕ
is satisfiable modulo T iff there exists M ∈ Mod(T ) such that M satisfies ϕ
(in symbols, M |= ϕ). A Σ-formula ϕ is valid modulo T iff its negation is
unsatisfiable modulo T and it is equivalent modulo T to a Σ-formula ϕ′ iff the
formula (ϕ ⇔ ϕ′) is valid modulo T . As notational conventions, the variables
u, r, p and their subscripted versions are of sort Users,Roles, and Permissions,
respectively; u, r, p denote tuples of variables of sort Users,Roles,Permission,
respectively; ϕ(x, pi) denotes a quantifier-free formula where at most the variables
in the tuple x may occur free and at most the predicate symbols in the tuple
pi may occur besides those of the signature over which ϕ is built. In this paper,
we consider only consistent theories axiomatized by universal sentences of the
form ∀x.ϕ(x). In the examples, we will make frequent use of the theory of scalar
values v1, ..., vn (for n ≥ 1) of type S, denoted with SV ({v1, ..., vn}, S), whose
signature consists of the sort S, the constant symbols v1, ..., vn of sort S, and it
is axiomatized by the following (universal) sentences: vi 6= vj for i, j = 1, ..., n,
i 6= j, and ∀x.(x = v1 ∨ · · · ∨ x = vn), where x is of sort S.
3.1 Symbolic representation of RBAC policies
Let TRole be a ΣRole -theory axiomatized by a finite set of universal sentences
where ΣRole contains the sort Role, the predicate , and countably many con-
stants of sort Role but no function symbol. Let TUser be a ΣUser -theory ax-
iomatized by a finite set of universal sentences where ΣUser contains the sort
User , countably many constants of sort User but no function symbol. Let
TPermission be a ΣPermission -theory axiomatized by a finite set of universal sen-
tences where ΣPermission contains the sort Role and countably many constants
of sort Permission but no function symbol. We emphasize that the signatures of
these three theories may contain finitely many predicate symbols besides those
mentioned above but no function symbols.
Example 2. For the version of ARBAC we are considering, the theory TRole
can be axiomatized by the following three universal sentences: ∀r.(r  r),
∀r1, r2.((r1  r2 ∧ r2  r1) ⇒ r1 = r2), and ∀r1, r2, r3.((r1  r2 ∧ r2  r3) ⇒
r1  r3). This means that  is interpreted as a partial order by the structures in
Mod(TRole). The set of basic roles and their positions in the partial order can be
defined, when considering Example 1, as the following sentences: Engineer 
Employee, PartT ime  Employee, FullT ime  Employee, ProjectLead 
Engineer, and Manager  FullT ime. The interested reader can see [7] for a
discussion on how to formalize ARBAC with parametric roles.
For the theory TUser , we have a similar flexibility. For example, if there is
only a finite and known number n ≥ 1 of users, say eu1 , ..., eun, then we can use the
theory of a scalar value SV ({eu1 , ..., eun},User). Another situation is when we have
a finite but unknown number of users whose identifiers are, for example, linearly
ordered (think of the integers with the usual order relation ‘less than or equal’).
In this case, we add the ordering relation ≤ of arity User × User to ΣUser and
the following universal sentences constrain ≤ to be a linear order: ∀u.(u ≤ u),
∀u1, u2, u3.((u1 ≤ u2 ∧ u2 ≤ u3) ⇒ u1 ≤ u3), ∀u1, u2.((u1 ≤ u2 ∧ u2 ≤ u1) ⇒
u1 = u2), and ∀u1, u2.(u1 ≤ u2∨u2 ≤ u1). If TUser = ∅, then the identifiers eui of
users can be compared for (dis-)equality and there is again a finite but unknown
number of users.
Similar observations also hold for TPermission . Often, there is only a finite
and known number of permissions that can be associated to roles. For example,
continuing the formalization of Example 1, recall that we have only three per-
missions: Access, View, and Edit. So, TPermission := SV ({Access, V iew,Edit},
Permission). uunionsq
As shown by the example above, the flexibility of our approach allows us to go
beyond standard ARBAC policies by specifying the domains of users, roles, and
permissions enjoying non-trivial algebraic properties which are useful to model,
e.g., property-based policies [16]. We leave a detailed analysis of the scope of
applicability of our framework to future work (as a first step in this direction,
see [6]).
Now, we define ΣARBAC := ΣRole ∪ ΣUser ∪ ΣPermission ∪ {pa, ua} and let
TARBAC := TRole ∪TUser ∪TPermission ∪PA, where PA is a set of (universal) sen-
tences over ΣRole ∪ΣPermission ∪{pa} characterizing the permission assignment
relation.
Example 3. Consider again Example 1. The permission-role assignment is ax-
iomatized by PA := {∀p, r.(pa(p, r) ⇔ ((p = Access ∧ r = Employee) ∨ (p =
View ∧ r = HumanResource) ∨ (p = Edit ∧ r = Engineer))}. uunionsq
Observe that a structure in Mod(TARBAC ) over ΣARBAC is a RBAC policy.
3.2 Symbolic representation of initial RBAC policies, constraints,
and goals
Since no axiom involving ua is in TARBAC , the interpretation of ua is arbitrary.
We consider the problem of how to constrain the interpretation of ua by means
of an example.
Example 4. We specify the user-role assignment of Example 1. Let TUser , TRole ,
and TPermission be as in Example 3. Consider the formula In(ua):
∀u, r.(ua(u, r)⇔ ((u = Alice ∧ r = PartT ime) ∨ (u = Alice ∧ r = Engineer) ∨
(u = Bob ∧ r = Manager) ∨ (u = Carol ∧ r = HumanResource))).
(Notice that In(ua) can be seen as the Clark’s completion [10] of the facts:
ua(Alice, PartT ime), ua(Alice, Engineer), ua(Bob,Manager), and ua(Carol,
HumanResource).) It is easy to see that the interpretation considered in Ex-
ample 1 satisfies In(ua). uunionsq
Since the formula In(ua) used in the example above belongs to the class of
universal sentences containing the state variable ua, we will use such a class of
formulae, and denote it with ∀-formulae, to symbolically specify initial RBAC
policies.
Example 5. Although in Example 4 the numbers of users and roles are fixed
to certain values, our framework does not require this. For example, recall the
discussion in Example 2 and take TUser = ∅, TRole = ∅. Then, consider the
following ∀-formula: ∀u, r.(ua(u, r) ⇔ (u 6= eu0 ∧ r 6= er0)). A RBAC policy s
satisfying the formula is such that (eu0 , e
r
0) 6∈ s(ua) and (eui , erj) ∈ s(ua) for every
pair (i, j) of natural numbers with i, j 6= 0. Thus, there is no bound on the
number of pairs (eui , e
r
j) in s(ua). uunionsq
Notice that ∀-formulae are not only useful to describe initial RBAC poli-
cies but also to express constraints on the set of states that can assign and
can revoke actions must satisfy. As an example, consider RBAC policies with
separation of duty constraints, i.e. a user cannot be assigned two given roles.
This can be enforced by using static mutually exclusive roles (SMER) con-
straints that require pairs of roles with disjoint membership (see, e.g., [23]).
Formulae representing SMER constraints are ∀-formulae with the following form:
∀u.¬(ua(u, eri )∧ua(u, erj)), for i, j ≥ 0 and i 6= j. Notice that other kinds of con-
straints can be specified in our framework as long as they can be expressed as
∀-formulae.
Example 6. Let us consider again the situation described in Example 1. One
may be interested in knowing if user Alice can take role FullTime and have
permission Access. This property can be encoded by the following formula:
∃u, r, p.(ua(u, r) ∧ pa(p, r) ∧ u = Alice ∧ r  FullT ime ∧ p = Access). uunionsq
Generalizing this example, we introduce ∃-formulae of the form ∃u, r, p.ϕ(u, r, p).
3.3 Symbolic representation of administrative actions
A policy literal is either ua(u, r), ¬ua(u, r), a literal over ΣUser (e.g., u = eui
or u 6= eui for i ≥ 0), or a literal over ΣRole (e.g., r = erj , r  erj , or their
negations for j ≥ 0). A policy expression is a finite conjunction of policy literals.
Administrative actions are represented by instances of formulae of the following
form:
∃u, r, u1, r1, r2, ..., rk. (C(u, r, u1, r1, r2, ..., rk)∧ ua′ = ua⊕ (u1, eri )) (1)
∃u, r, u1. (C(u, r, u1) ∧ ua′ = ua	 (u1, eri )) (2)
where k, i ≥ 0, C is a policy expression called the guard of the transition, primed
variables denote the value of the state variable ua after the execution of the
transition, ua (u, eri ) abbreviates
λw, v.(if (w = u ∧ v = eri ) then b else ua(w, v)),
and b is true when  is ⊕ and it is false when  is 	.4 It is possible to symbol-
ically represent can assign actions as formulae of the form (1) and can revoke
actions as formulae of the form (2). We illustrate this with an example.
Example 7. We specify in our framework the administrative actions given in Ex-
ample 1. The can assign action 〈Manager, {Engineer, FullT ime}, P rojectLead〉
corresponds to the following instance of (1):
∃u, r, u1, r1, r2.
ua(u, r) ∧ r Manager ∧ u 6= Carol∧ua(u1, r1) ∧ r1  Engineer ∧ ua(u1, r2) ∧ r2  FullT ime∧
ua′ = ua⊕ (u1, P rojectLead)
 .
Two observations are in order. First, the literal u 6= Carol disables the transition
when u is instantiated to Carol. This allows us to model the set T = {Carol}
of users that are prevented to execute assignments. Second, by simple logi-
cal manipulations and recalling the definition of the abbreviation ua∗ intro-
duced in Section 2, it is possible to rewrite the guard of the transition as
ua∗(u,Manager)∧ua∗(u1, Engineer)∧ua∗(u1, FullT ime)∧u 6= Carol. The sim-
pler can assign rules 〈HumanResource, ∅, FullT ime〉 and 〈HumanResource, ∅,
PartT ime〉 can be specified by the following two instances of (1):
∃u, r, u1.
(
ua(u, r) ∧ r  HumanResource ∧ u 6= Carol ∧
ua′ = ua⊕ (u1, FullT ime)
)
∃u, r, u1.
(
ua(u, r) ∧ r  HumanResource ∧ u 6= Carol ∧
ua′ = ua⊕ (u1, PartT ime)
)
.
Following [17], we call AATU (an abbreviation for ‘assignment and trusted
users’) the set containing the above three formulae.
The can revoke action 〈Manager, ProjectLead〉 is formalized by the follow-
ing instance of (2): ∃u, r.(ua(u, r)∧r Manager ∧ ua′ = ua	(u1, P rojectLead)).
The remaining three can revokes can be obtained from the formula above by
simply replacing Manager and ProjectLead with Manager and Engineer for
4 We use λ-notation here for the sake of readability only. The same formulae can
be easily recast in pure first-order logic. For example, (1) can be written as
∃u, r, r1, ..., rk.(C(u, r, r1, ..., rk) ∧ ∀w, r.(ua′(w, r)⇔ ((w = u ∧ r = er) ∨ ua(w, r))).
〈Manager,Engineer〉, with HumanResource and FullTime for 〈HumanResource,
FullT ime〉, and with HumanResource and PartTime for 〈HumanResource,
PartT ime〉. uunionsq
Notice that the guards of the transitions of the form (1) do not correspond
exactly to those introduced in Section 2. On the one hand, policy expressions
give us the possibility to require a user u to be an explicit member of a certain
role r in the guard of transition (by writing ua∗(u, r)) while preconditions of
a can assign can only require a user to be an implicit member of a role (i.e.
ua∗(u, r)). On the other hand, it is not possible, in general, to express ¬ua∗(u, r)
(i.e. u is neither an explicit nor an implicit member of r), although it is possible
to use ¬ua(u, r) (i.e. u is not an explicit member of r). This is so because to
express ¬ua∗(u, r), a universal quantification is required; recall from Section 2
that ¬ua∗(u, r) abbreviates ∀r′.(r′  r ⇒ ¬ua(u, r)). In other words, only a
limited form of negation can be expressed in the guards of our formalization of
a can assign action. This simplifies the technical development that follows, in
particular the proof of termination of the procedure used to solve the user-role
reachability problem (see Section 4 for details). We plan to adapt a technique
used in infinite state model checking for handling global conditions to allow
¬ua∗(u, r) in the guards of transitions (see, e.g., [4]) but leave this to future work.
Here, we observe that in many situations of practical relevance, it is possible to
overcome this difficulty. For example, when there are only finitely many roles
ranging over a set R, it is possible to eliminate the hierarchy as explained in [21]
so that the framework proposed in this paper applies without problems. It is
worth noticing that although the set of roles has been assumed to be bounded,
our framework supports the situation where the set of users can be finite but its
cardinality is unknown.
3.4 Reachability and satisfiability modulo TARBAC
At this point, it should be clear that the (algebraic) structures of users, roles,
and permission can be specified by suitable theories; that we can symbolically
represent RBAC policies and goals by using ∀-formulae and ∃-formulae, respec-
tively, can assign actions by formulae of the form (1), and can revoke actions
by formulae of the form (2). As a consequence, we can rephrase the user-goal
reachability problem introduced in Section 2 as follows.
Let TARBAC be a ΣARBAC -theory given as described above and specifying
the structure of users, roles, permission, role hierarchy, and the permission-role
relation. If Γ := (S0, A) is an ARBAC policy together with a set C of constraints
on the set of states that the actions of the system must satisfy (e.g., SMER), then
derive the associated symbolic ARBAC policy Γs := (In(ua), T r, C) as explained
above, where In is a ∀-formula representing the initial set S0 of RBAC policies,
Tr is a finite set of instances of (1) or of (2) corresponding to the actions in A,
and C is a finite set of ∀-formula representing constraints in C. Furthermore, let
γs be an ∃-formula of the form
∃u1, r1, p1, ..., un, rn, pn.
n∧
i=1
(ua(ui, ri) ∧ ri ./ erji ∧ pi = epji), (3)
called a symbolic goal and corresponding to a goal RP := {(erji , epji) | i = 1, ..., n},
where ./∈ {=,}. Then, it is easy to see that the user-role reachability problem
for Γ with RP as goal is solvable iff there exists a natural number ` ≥ 0 such
that the formula
In(ua0) ∧
∧`
i=0
(ι(ai) ∧ τ(uai, uai+1) ∧ ι(ai+1)) ∧ γs(ua`) (4)
is satisfiable modulo TARBAC , where τ is the disjunction of the formulae in Tr,
and ι is the disjunction of those in C. Notice that the (big) conjunction over `
with In in (4) can be seen as a characterization of the set of states (forward)
reachable from the initial set of states. Symmetrically (and more interestingly for
the rest of this paper), the (big) conjunction over ` with γs in (4) characterizes
the set of states backward reachable from the goal states. We observe that when
` = 0, no actions must be performed and already some of the states in In satisfies
γs, thus, formula (4) simplifies to In(ua0) ∧ ι(ua0) ∧ γs(ua0).
Example 8. We illustrate the check for satisfiability of the formula (4) for ` = 0
by reconsidering the situation described in Example 6. The problem was to
establish if the formula In(ua) of Example 4 and the goal formula of Example 6
are satisfiable modulo the theory TARBAC in Example 3. We assume that the
set of constraints of the symbolic ARBAC polices is empty. In this context, the
formula (4) above can be written as follows:
PO := ∀u, r.(ua(u, r)⇔

(u = Alice ∧ r = PartT ime) ∨
(u = Alice ∧ r = Engineer) ∨
(u = Bob ∧ r = Manager) ∨
(u = Carol ∧ r = HumanResource)
) ∧
∃u1, r1, p1.(ua(u1, r1) ∧ pa(p1, r1) ∧ u1 = Alice ∧ r1  FullT ime ∧ p=Access) ,
where the existentially quantified variables in the goal have been renamed for
clarity. The problem is to establish the satisfiability of PO modulo the theory
TARBAC in Example 3. As it will be seen below, there exists an algorithm capable
of answering this question automatically. For PO, the algorithm would return
‘unsatisfiable,’ entitling us to conclude that the set of initial states considered in
Example 4 do not satisfy the goal of allowing Alice, who is a full-time employee,
to get access to a certain resource. uunionsq
If we were able to automatically check the satisfiability of formulae of the form
(4), an idea to solve the user-role reachability problem for ARBAC policies would
be to generate instances of (4) for increasing values of `. However, this would not
give us a decision procedure for solving the goal reachability problem but only
function BReach(Γ : (In, Tr, C), γ : ∃-formula)
1 P ←− γ; B ←− false; τ ←− ∨
t∈Tr t; ι←−
∧
i∈C i;
2 while (ι ∧ P ∧ ¬B is satisfiable modulo TARBAC ) do
3 if (In ∧ P is satisfiable modulo TARBAC )
then return reachable;
4 B ←− P ∨B;
5 P ←− Pre(τ, P );
6 end
7 return unreachable;
Fig. 1. The basic backward reachability procedure
a semi-decision procedure. In fact, the method terminates only when the goal is
reachable from the initial state, i.e. when, for a certain value of `, the instance of
the formula (4) is unsatisfiable modulo TARBAC . When, instead, the goal is not
reachable, the check will never detect the unsatisfiability and we will be forced
to generate an infinite sequence of instances of (4) for increasing values of `. In
other words, the decidability of the satisfiability of (4) modulo TARBAC is only
a necessary condition for ensuring the decidability of the user-role reachability
problem. Fortunately, is possible to stop enumerating instances of (4) for a cer-
tain value ` of ` when the formula characterizing the set of reachable states for
` = `+ 1 implies that characterizing the set of reachable states for ` = `; i.e. we
have detected a fixed-point. We explore this idea in the following section.
4 Symbolic analysis of ARBAC policies
A general approach to solve the user-role reachability problem is based on com-
puting the set of backward reachable states. It is well-known that the com-
putation of sets of backward (rather than forward) reachable states is easier
to mechanize. For n ≥ 0, the n-pre-image of a formula K(ua) is a formula
Pren(τ,K) recursively defined as follows: Pre0(τ,K) := K and Pren+1(τ,K) :=
Pre(τ, Pren(τ,K)), where5
Pre(τ,K) := ∃ua′.(τ(ua, ua′) ∧K(ua′)). (5)
The formula Pren(τ, γ) describes the set of states from which it is possible to
reach the goal γ in n ≥ 0 steps. At the n-th iteration of the loop, the back-
ward reachability algorithm depicted in Figure 1, stores the formula Pren(τ, γ)
in the variable P and the formula BRn(τ, γ) :=
∨n
i=0 Pre
i(τ, γ) (representing
the set of states from which the goal γ is reachable in at most n steps) in
5 In (5), we use a second order quantifier over the relation symbol ua, representing the
state of the system. This should not worry the reader expert in first-order theorem
proving since a higher-order feature is only used to give the definition of pre-image.
We will see that we can compute a first-order formula logically equivalent to (5) so
that only first-order techniques should be used to mechanize our approach.
the variable B. While computing BRn(τ, γ), BReach also checks whether the
goal is reachable in n steps (cf. line 3, which can be read as In ∧ Pren(τ, γ)
is satisfiable modulo TARBAC ) or a fixed-point has been reached (cf. line 2,
which can be read as ¬((ι∧BRn(τ, γ))⇒ BRn−1(τ, γ)) is unsatisfiable modulo
TARBAC or, equivalently, that ((ι∧BRn(τ, γ))⇒ BRn−1(τ, γ)) is valid modulo
TARBAC ). Notice that BR
n−1(τ, γ)⇒ BRn(τ, γ) is valid by construction; thus,
if ((ι∧BRn(τ, γ))⇒ BRn−1(τ, γ)) is a logical consequence of TARBAC , then also
((ι ∧ BRn(τ, γ))⇔ BRn−1(τ, γ)) is so and a fixed-point has been reached. The
invariant ι is conjoined to the set of backward reachable states when performing
the fixed-point check as only those states that also satisfies the constraints are
required to be considered. When BReach returns unreachable (cf. line 7), the
variable B stores the formula describing the set of states which are backward
reachable from γ which is also a fixed-point. Otherwise, when it returns reachable
(cf. line 3) at the n-th iteration, there exists a run of length n that leads the AR-
BAC policy from a RBAC policy in In to one in γ. We observe that for BReach
to be an effective (possibly non-terminating) procedure, it is mandatory that (i)
the formulae used to describe the set of backward reachable states are closed
under pre-image computation and (ii) both the satisfiability test for safety (line
3) and that for fixed-point (line 2) are effective.
Regarding (i), it is sufficient to prove the following result.
Property 1. Let K be an ∃-formula. If τ is of the form (1) or (2), then Pre(τ,K)
is equivalent (modulo TARBAC ) to an effectively computable ∃-formula.
Proof. Let K(ua) := ∃u˜, r˜.γ(u˜, r˜, ua(u˜, r˜)), where γ is a quantifier-free formula.
By definition, Pre(τ,K) is ∃ua′.(τ(ua, ua′)∧K(ua′)) and there are two cases to
consider. The former is when τ is of the form (1). In this case, ∃ua′.(τ(ua, ua′)∧
K(ua′)) is equivalent to
∃u, r, u1, r1, r2, ..., rk.
(
C(u, r, u1, r1, r2, ..., rk)∧
∃u˜, r˜.γ(u˜, r˜, (ua⊕ (u1, er))(u˜, r˜))
)
by simple logical manipulations and recalling the definition of K. In turn, this
can be expanded to
∃u, r, u1, r1, r2, ..., rk.(C(u, r, u1, r1, r2, ..., rk)∧
∃u˜, r˜.γ(u˜, r˜, (λw, r.(if (w = u ∧ r = er) then true else ua(w, r)))(u˜, r˜)))
by recalling the definition of ⊕. It is possible to eliminate the λ-expression by
observing that each of its occurrence will be applied to a pair of existentially
quantified variables from u˜, r˜ so that β-reduction can be applied. After this
phase, the ‘if-then-else’ expressions can be eliminated by using a simple case-
analysis followed by the moving out of the existential quantifiers that allows
us to obtain an ∃-formula. This concludes the proof of this case. The second
case, i.e. when τ is of the form (2), is omitted because almost identical to the
previous. uunionsq
Observe also that Pre(
∨n
i=1 τi,K) is equivalent to
∨n
i=1 Pre(τi,K) for τi of forms
(1) and (2), for i = 1, ..., n.
Example 9. To illustrate Property 1, we consider one of the transitions written
in Example 7 and the goal in Example 6. We compute the pre-image w.r.t. the
second transition in AATU (where HR stands for HumanResource and FT for
FullT ime), i.e.
∃u, r, p.(ua′(u, r) ∧ pa(p, r) ∧ u = Alice ∧ r  FT ∧ p = Access) ∧
∃u1, r1, u2.(ua(u1, r1) ∧ r1 = HR ∧ u1 6= Carol ∧ ua′ = ua⊕ (u2, FT )) ,
where ua′ is implicitly existentially quantified. By simple logical manipulations,
we have
∃u, r, p, u1, r1, u2.(pa(p, r) ∧ (if u = u2 ∧ r = FT then true else ua(u, r)) ∧
u = Alice ∧ r  FT ∧ p = Access ∧ ua(u1, r1) ∧ r1 = HR ∧ u1 6= Carol),
which, by case analysis and some simplification steps, can be rewritten to
∃u, r, p, u1, r1, u2.(pa(p, r) ∧ (r = FT ∧ u2 = Alice ∧ p = Access ∧
ua(u1, r1) ∧ r1 = HR ∧ u1 6= Carol) ∨
(pa(p, r) ∧ u 6= u2 ∧ ua(u, r) ∧ u = Alice ∧ r  FT ∧ p = Access ∧
ua(u1, r1) ∧ r1 = HR ∧ u1 6= Carol) ∨
(pa(p, r) ∧ r 6= FT ∧ ua(u, r) ∧ u = Alice ∧ r  FT ∧ p = Access ∧
ua(u1, r1) ∧ r1 = HR ∧ u1 6= Carol)) ,
which is an ∃-formula according to Property 1. uunionsq
Concerning the decidability of the satisfiability tests for safety and fixed-point
in the backward reachability algorithm in Figure 1 (point (ii) above), we observe
that the formulae at lines 2 and 3 can be effectively transformed to formulae
in the form ∃x∀y.ϕ(x, y, ua) where x and y are disjoint, which belong to the
Bernays-Scho¨nfinkel-Ramsey (BSR) class (see, e.g., [18]). To see how this is pos-
sible, let us consider the formulae at line 2. This is the conjunction of a ∀-formula
(ι), an ∃-formula (as discussed above, the variable P stores Pren(τ, γ), which
by Property 1 is an ∃-formula), and another ∀-formula (as discussed above, the
variable B stores
∨n
i=0 Pre
i(τ, γ) whose negation is a conjunction of ∀-formulae
by Property 1, which is a ∀-formula). By moving out quantifiers (which is always
possible as quantified variables can be suitably renamed), it is straightforward
to obtain a BSR formula. Now, let us turn our attention to the formula at line
3. It is obtained by conjoining a ∀-formula (In is so by assumption) and an
∃-formula (stored in the variable P , see previous case). Again, by simple logical
manipulations, it is not difficult to obtain a formula in the BSR class. We also
observe that checking the satisfiability of BSR formulae modulo TARBAC can
be reduced to checking the satisfiability of formulae in the BSR class since all
the axioms of TARBAC are universal sentences, i.e. BSR formulae. Collecting all
these observations, we can state the following result.
Property 2. The satisfiability tests at lines 2 and 3 of the backward reachability
procedure in Figure 1 are decidable.
This property is a corollary of the decidability of the satisfiability of the BSR
class (see, e.g., [18]). Example 9 above contains an illustration of a satisfiability
test to which Property 2 applies.
4.1 Termination
The closure under pre-image computation (Property 1) and the decidability of
the satisfiability checks (Property 2) guarantee the possibility to mechanize the
backward reachability procedure in Figure 1 but do not eliminate the risk of
non-termination. There are various sources of diverge. For example, the existen-
tial prefix of a pre-image is extended at each pre-image computation with new
variables as shown in the proof of Property 1. Another potential problem is that
the fixed-point could not be expressed by using disjunctions of ∃-formulae (ac-
cording to line 4 in Figure 1) even if it exists so that the procedure is only able
to compute approximations and thus never terminates. To show that both prob-
lems can be avoided and that the procedure in Figure 1 terminates, we follow the
approach proposed in [14, 5] for proving the termination of backward reachabil-
ity for certain classes of infinite state systems. We introduce a model-theoretic
notion of certain sets of states, called configurations, which are the semantic
counter-part of ∃-formulae, and then define a well-quasi-order on them: this,
according to the results in [5], implies the termination of the backward reach-
ability procedure. For lack of space, the full technical development is omitted
and can be found in [7]; here, we only sketch the main ideas. We also point out
that this result can be seen as a special case of that in [14], developed in a more
general framework that allows for the formalization and the analysis of safety
properties for concurrent, distributed, and timed systems as well as algorithms
manipulating arrays. However, we believe worthwhile to prove termination for
the procedure presented in this paper (along the lines of [14]) as some technical
definitions become much simpler.
A state of the symbolic ARBAC policy Γ := (In, Tr, C) is a structure M ∈
Mod(TARBAC), i.e. it is an RBAC policy belonging to a certain class of first-
order structures. A configuration of Γ is a state M such that the cardinality of
the domain of M is finite. Intuitively, a configuration is a finite representation
of a possibly infinite set of states that “contains at least the part mentioned
in the configuration.” The following example can help to grasp the underlying
intuition.
Example 10. As in Example 5, let TUser = ∅, TRole = ∅. Consider the ∃-
formula: ∃u, r.(ua(u, r) ∧ u = eu0 ∧ r = er0). There is no bound on the number of
pairs (eui , e
r
k) in a RBAC policy s satisfying the ∃-formula above provided that
(eu0 , e
r
0) ∈ s(ua). Our procedure for the reachability problem considers (only)
those RBAC policies s of the form s(ua) = {(eu0 , er0)}∪∆ where ∆ is a (possibly
empty) set of pairs (eui , e
r
k) with i, j 6= 0. In other words, the procedure considers
all those configurations which contain at least the pair (eu0 , e
r
0) mentioned in the
∃-formula above plus any other (finite) set ∆ of pairs. uunionsq
The idea that a configuration represents a (possibly infinite) set of RBAC poli-
cies sharing a common (finite) set of user-role assignments can be made precise
by using the notion of partial order. A pre-order (P,≤) is the set P endowed
with a reflexive and transitive relation. An upward closed set U of the pre-
order (P,≤) is such that U ⊆ P and if p ∈ U and p ≤ q then q ∈ U . A
cone is an upward closed set of the form ↑ p = {q ∈ P | p ≤ q}. We define a
pre-order on configurations as follows. Let M and M′ be configurations of Γ ;
M≤M′ iff there exists an embedding from M to M′. Roughly, an embedding
is a homomorphism that preserves and reflects relations (see [7] for a formal
definition) . A configuration is the semantic counter-part of an ∃-formula. Let
[[K]] := {M ∈Mod(TARBAC ) | M |= K}, where K is an ∃-formula.
Lemma 1. The following facts hold: (i) for every ∃-formula K, the set [[K]] is
upward closed and (ii) [[K1]] ⊆ [[K2]] iff (K1 ⇒ K2) is valid modulo TARBAC ,
for every pair of ∃-formulae K1,K2.
An upward closed set U is finitely generated iff it is a finite union of cones.
A pre-order (P,≤) is a well-quasi-ordering (wqo) iff every upward closed sets
of P is finitely generated. This is equivalent to the standard definition of wqo,
see [14] for a proof. The idea is to use only finitely generated upward closed
sets as configurations so that their union is also finitely generated and we can
conclude that the backward reachability procedure in Figure 1 is terminating
because of the duality between configurations and ∃-formulae (Lemma 1).
Theorem 1. The backward reachability procedure in Figure 1 terminates.
As a corollary, we immediately obtain the following fact.
Theorem 2. The user-role reachability problem is decidable.
This result is more general that those in [17, 23] which assume a bounded number
of users and roles. We are more general than [22] in allowing for a finite but
unknown number of users and roles while in [22] the users are bounded and only
the roles are parametric. However, we allow for only a restricted form of negation
in the preconditions of can assign actions while [22] seems to allow for arbitrary
negation. Moreover, our procedure can consider several initial RBAC policies at
the same time while [17, 23, 22] can handle only one.
Finally, notice that we can reduce other analysis problems (e.g., role contain-
ment) to user-role reachability problems and thus show their decidability. For
lack of space, this can be found in [7].
5 Preliminary experiments
We briefly discuss some experiments with a prototype implementation of the
symbolic reachability procedure in Figure 1 that we call ASSA, short for Au-
tomated Symbolic Security Analyser. We consider the synthetic benchmarks
described in [23] and available on the web at [2] whereby both the number of
users and roles is bounded. We perform a comparative analysis between ASSA
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Fig. 2. Comparison between ASSA and Stoller on some benchmarks from [23, 2]
and the state-of-the-art tool in [23], called Stoller below. Our findings shows
that ASSA scales better than Stoller on this set of benchmarks; the experiments
were conducted on an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU T5870, 2 GHz, 3 GB RAM,
running Linux Debian 2.6.32.
A client-server architecture is the most obvious choice to implement the pro-
posed symbolic backward reachability procedure. The client generates the se-
quence of formulae representing pre-images of the formula representing the goal.
In addition, the client is also assumed to generate the formulae characterising
the tests for fix-point or for non-empty intersection with the initial set of poli-
cies. The server performs the checks for satisfiability modulo TARBAC and can
be implemented by using state-of-the-art automated deduction systems such as
automated theorem provers (in our case, SPASS [3]) or SMT solvers (in our case,
Z3 [1]). Although these tools are quite powerful, preliminary experiments have
shown that the formulae to be checked for satisfiability generated by the client
quickly become very large and are not easily solved by available state-of-the-art
tools. A closer look at the formulae reveals that they can be greatly simplified
with substantial speed-ups in the performances of the reasoning systems. To
this end, some heuristics have been implemented whose description is not possi-
ble here for lack of space; the interested reader is pointed to [6] for a complete
description and more experiments.
We consider the randomly generated benchmarks in [2], where only the user-
role assignment relation ua can be modified by can assign or can revoke actions
(as assumed in Section 2). These benchmarks were generated under two addi-
tional simplifying assumptions: (i) a fixed number of users and roles, and (ii)
absence of role hierarchy (this is without loss of generality under assumption (i)
as observed in [23]). Besides the number of roles, one of the key parameter of the
benchmarks (according to the parametrised complexity result derived in [23]) is
the goal size, i.e. the number of roles in the set RP of a goal reachability prob-
lem (as defined at the end of Section 2) or, equivalently, the number of constants
of sort Role occurring in the symbolic goal (3) of Section 3.4. The benchmarks
are divided in five classes. The first and the second classes were used to evalu-
ate the worst-case behavior of forward search algorithms (i.e. when the goal is
unreachable) described in [23]. Our backward procedure (almost) immediately
detects unreachability by realizing that no action is backward applicable. The
fourth and fifth classes of benchmarks fix the goal size to one while the values of
other parameters (e.g., the cardinality of the set R of roles) grow. In particular,
the fourth class was used to show that the cost of analysis grows very slowly
as a function of the number of roles while the fifth aimed to compare the per-
formances of an enhanced version of the forward and the backward algorithms
of [23]. For both classes, ASSA confirms that its running time grows very slowly
according to the results reported in [23]. However, ASSA is slightly slower than
Stoller because of the overhead of invoking automated reasoning systems for
checking for fix-points instead of the ad hoc techniques of [23]. The most inter-
esting class of problems is the third, which was used to evaluate the scalability
of the backward reachability algorithm of [23] with respect to increasing val-
ues of the goal size 1, 2, 3, and 4. Figure 2 shows four scatter plots for values
1, 2, 3, and 4 of the goal size: the X and Y axes report the median times of
ASSA and Stoller, respectively (logarithmic scale), to solve the 32 reachability
problems in the third class of the benchmarks. A dot above the diagonal means
a better performance of ASSA and viceversa; the time out was set to 1, 800 sec.
Although, both Stoller and ASSA were able to solve all the problems within the
time-out, our tool is slower for goal sizes 1 and 2, behaves as Stoller for goal
size 3, but outperforms this for goal size 4. These results are encouraging and
seem to confirm the scalability of our techniques. For a detailed description of
the implementation of ASSA and a more comprehensive experimental evaluation
(confirming these results), the reader is pointed to [6].
6 Discussion
We have proposed a symbolic framework for the automated analysis of ARBAC
policies that allowed us to prove the decidability of the parametric reachability
problem. We used a decidable fragment of first-order logic to represent the states
and the actions of ARBAC policies to design a symbolic procedure to explore
the (possibly infinite) state space. Preliminary results with a prototype tool
implementing the backward reachability procedure in Figure 1 are encouraging.
A detailed description of the implementation of the prototype and an extensive
experimental analysis is available in [6].
There are two main directions for future work. First, it would be interesting
to study to what extent other variants of ARBAC can be formalized in our frame-
work, e.g., for UARBAC [16]. Second, we want to adapt techniques developed in
the context of infinite state model checking to eliminate universal quantifiers in
guards of administrative actions (called global conditions, see, e.g., [4]), to allow
for unrestricted negation in can assigns.
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Plan of the Appendixes
We provide some additional material to illustrate and integrate the results pre-
sented in the paper:
– Appendix A discusses how to formalize parametric roles in our framework
and explain that the decidability result for user-role reachability also cover
this scenario.
– Appendix B presents the formal details of the termination of the backward
reachability procedure in Figure 1.
– Appendix C discusses three related security analysis problems for ARBAC
polices (namely, inductive policy invariant, role containment, and weakest
preconditions) and their relationship with the user-role reachability problem.
– Finally, Appendix D describes in some detail an execution of the sym-
bolic backward reachability procedure Figure 1 on a simple example taken
from [23].
A Formalizing parametric roles
Here, we explain how it is possible to model ARBAC policies with parametrised
roles as considered in, e.g., [22].
A role schema can be seen as an expression of the form ρ(p1, ..., pn) for
n ≥ 0, where ρ is a role name and pi is a distinct parameter name i = 1, ..., n.
Each parameter can take values from a given data type containing an infinite
number of values. An instance of a role schema is an expression of the form
ρ(p1 = t1, ..., pn = tn), where ti is a data value or a variable. For example, in the
university policy considered in [22], the role schema Student(dept, cid) is used for
students registered for the course numbered cid offered by department dept, the
role schema Student(dept) is used for all students of a specific department dept,
and the instance Student(dept = cs, cid = 101) identifies students of the Com-
puter Science department taking course 101. Role schemas can be overloaded by
using parameter names; e.g., Student can have one parameter named dept or two
parameters named dept and cid. A parametrised version of ARBAC policies can
use parametric roles to express role assignment and revocation in a very compact
way. For example, in the case of the university policy, one can have the follow-
ing role schemas: Chair(dept), Student(dept, cid), and TA(dept, cid). Then, a
can assign rule is the following: the chair of department D (i.e. a user belonging
to the role Chair(dept = D)) can assign a student of a department D taking
course cs (i.e. a user belonging to the role Student(dept = D, cid = CID))
to be the teaching assistant of that course (i.e. a user belonging to the role
TA(dept = D, cid = CID)).
In our symbolic framework, this situation can be formalized as follows. We
introduce a predicate symbol extended with an extra argument for each para-
metric role, i.e. if the number of role names in the role schema ρ is n, then we
use a predicate symbol ρ of arity n + 1 (this technique is standard for exam-
ple to translate Entity-Relationship diagram schemas to fragments of first-order
logic). For the example above, we introduce the following predicate symbols:
Chair , Student , and TA of arity 2, 3, and 3, respectively. We do not use param-
eter names, instead we fix an order on them so that we can use the standard
way of building atoms in first-order logic. When a role schema is overloaded, we
introduce a different predicate symbol in order to disambiguate the situation; a
simple automated pre-processing phase can be used to eliminate overloading. In
this context, the ‘can assign rule above can be written as follows:
∃u, r,D,CID, u1, r1, r2.
Chair(D, r) ∧ ua(u, r) ∧Student(D,CID, r1) ∧ ua(u1, r1) ∧
TA(D,CID, r2) ∧ ua′ = ua⊕ (u1, r2)
 ,
where the variables r, r1, and r2 are used as the names of the roles corresponding
to the particular value of the attributes in the role schema. This means that we
need to require that each relation is functional or, equivalently, that the inter-
pretation of the predicate symbols must be partial functions. In our framework,
this can be done by adding suitable formulae to the background theory TARBAC .
For the example of the university policy considered above, we can simply write
the following two ∀-formulae:
∀D, r1, r2.((Chair(D, r1) ∧ Chair(D, r2))⇒ r1 = r2)
∀D,CID, r1, r2.((Student(D,CID, r1) ∧ Student(D,CID, r2))⇒ r1 = r2)
∀D,CID, r1, r2.((TA(D,CID, r1) ∧ TA(D,CID, r2))⇒ r1 = r2).
Notice also that we can specify additional constraints among two or more rela-
tions if we can express them as ∀-formulae. It is not obvious how this feature can
be added to the approach in [22]. For the example above, we have mentioned
that we can have a role schema Student(dept) for identifying all students in the
department dept. Indeed, Student(dept, cid) must characterize sub-sets of users
of the role Student(dept). If we introduce a binary predicate symbol Student1
of arity 2 corresponding to the role schema Student(dept), then we can express
this by the following ∀-formula:
∀D,CID, r.(Student(D,CID, r)⇒ Student1(D, r)),
which can be added to TARBAC .
To summarize, our framework can handle parametrised roles as follows. First,
the sub-theory TRole of TARBAC becomes many-sorted: besides the sort Role,
we introduce as many sort symbols—called parameter sorts—as domains for
the parameters of each role. Furthermore, for each role symbol ρ of arity n,
we introduce a predicate symbol of arity n + 1. Overloading is eliminated by
introducing decorated versions of the predicate symbol and an order on the
parameter names is fixed so that we can use the standard way of building atoms
of first-order logic. Second, for each predicate symbol ρ of arity n + 1, we add
the following functional constraint to TRole and hence to TARBAC :
∀x, r1, r2.((ρ(x, r1) ∧ ρ(x, r2))⇒ r1 = r2),
where x is a tuple of length n of variables of appropriate sorts. If needed, we
can add further constraints, (e.g., formalizing relationship between different role
symbols) if these can be expressed as ∀-formulae. For example, it is worth notic-
ing how to express the role hierarchy for parametrised role. Besides the usual
axioms requiring  to be a partial order, we can add also ∀-formulae of the
following form:
∀x, y, r1, r2.((ρ1(x, r1) ∧ ρ2(y, r2))⇒ r1  r2),
where x, y are tuples of variables of appropriate sorts, ρ1, ρ2 are two predicates
representing parametric roles. This axiom requires that all instances of the para-
metric role ρ1 are senior than those of role ρ2. Notice that one can design more
sophisticated hierarchical relationships between role instances depending on the
values of the parameters, provided that the signature is rich enough to express
the constraints between the values of the parameters and that only ∀-formulae
are used.
Finally, can assign and can revoke actions can be written by using existen-
tially quantified variables ranging over the parameter names besides those rang-
ing over users and roles; thus generalizing the shapes of actions (1) and (2).
Formally, transitions have the following forms:
∃u, r, u1, r1, r2, ..., rk, p. (C(u, r, u1, r1, r2, ..., rk, p)∧ ua′ = ua⊕ (u1, er))
∃u, r, u1, p. (C(u, r, u1, p) ∧ ua′ = ua	 (u1, er))
where p is a tuple of variables of parameter sorts and C is a constraint in which
also literals built out of the predicate symbols introduced for modelling para-
metric roles may occur.
All the results proved in Sections 4 and 4 can be easily extended to cover
ARBAC policies with parametric roles as soon as we observe that the formulae
introduced here satisfy the assumptions on the theory TARBAC of Section 3.
B Termination of backward reachability
B.1 Pre- and well-quasi-orders: definitions and basic properties
A pre-order (P,≤) is the set P endowed with a reflexive and transitive relation.
We say that ≤ is decidable if, given p1 and p2 in P , we can algorithmically check
whether p1 ≤ p2. An upward closed set U of the pre-order (P,≤) is such that
U ⊆ P and if p ∈ U and p ≤ q then q ∈ U . A cone is an upward closed set of
the form ↑ p = {q ∈ P | p ≤ q}. An upward closed set U is finitely generated iff
it is a finite union of cones.
For an upward closed set U , a generator of U is a set G such that (a) U =⋃
g∈G ↑ g and (b) g1 ≤ g2 implies g1 = g2, for every g1, g2 ∈ G. It is easy to
see that G contains only minimal elements (w.r.t. ≤) but, in general, it needs
not to be unique. In any case, it is always possible to define a function gen(U)
returning a unique generator of U (the same chosen among the many possible
ones).
A pre-order (P,≤) is a well-quasi-ordering (wqo) iff every upward closed sets
of P is finitely generated (this is equivalent to the standard definition of wqo,
see [14] for a proof). In the case of a wqo, gen(U) is finite because of property
(b) of the definition of generator of U . This implies that every upward closed set
U can be characterized by a finite set of configurations, namely gen(U).
B.2 Some notions and results of model-theory
LetM be a Σ-structure. A substructure ofM is a Σ-structure N whose domain
is contained in that ofM and such that the interpretations of the symbols of Σ
in N are restrictions of the interpretation of these symbols inM; conversely, we
say that M is a superstructure of N . Let C be a class of structures; we say that
C is closed under substructures if M ∈ C and N is a substructure of M, then
N ∈ C.
Property 3. A class C of structures is closed under substructures iff there exists
a theory T such that T contains only ∀-formulae and Mod(T ) = C.
A proof of this result can be found in any book on model theory, e.g., [15].
Let M and N two structures over the same signature Σ and M,N be their
domains, respectively; an embedding s is an injective mapping from M to N
such that (i) s(fM(e1, ...., en)) = fN (s(e1), ..., s(en)) for each function symbol
f in the signature Σ and (ii) (e1, ..., en) ∈ RM iff (s(e1), ..., s(em)) ∈ N for each
predicate symbol R in Σ, where (e1, ..., en) is a tuple of elements in M of length
equal to the arity of f or R, respectively. In other words, an embedding is a
homomorphism that preserves and reflects relations. It is possible to show (see,
e.g., [15]) that any embedding can be seen as the composition of an isomorphism
followed by an “extension,” i.e. if there is an embedding from M to N , we can
assume that M is a substructure of N (or dually, N is a superstructure of M).
Abstractly, (Robinson) diagrams give a logical formulation of model theoretic
properties such as “there exists an embedding from structure M to structure
N .” The importance of this will be clear when considering the definition of the
pre-order on configurations (given in terms of the existence of an embedding
between structures). Let M be a Σ-structure and A be a sub-set of the domain
ofM; Σ(A) is the signature obtained by adding to Σ new symbols of constants
a for a ∈ A. We can regard M as a Σ(A)-structure when the interpretation
function ofM is extended so that every element a in A is mapped to the constant
a. The (Robinson) diagram of A in M, in symbols δM(A), is the set L of all
Σ(A)-literals such that M |= `, for every ` ∈ L.
Lemma 2 (Diagram Lemma). Let M and N be two Σ-structures and M be
the domain of M. Then, there exists an embedding from M to N iff N can be
expanded to a Σ(M)-structure which is a model of δM(M).
The proof of this fact is an immediate consequence of the definition of Robin-
son diagram given above and can be found in any book on model theory (see,
e.g., [15]).
B.3 A pre-order on configurations: formal definition
Let Γ be a symbolic ARBAC policy, i.e.
Γ := (In(ua), {τ1(ua, ua′), ..., τn(ua, ua′)}, {ι1(ua), ..., ιm(ua)})
where In is a ∀-formula, ιj is a ∀-formula, and τi is a transition formula of the
forms (1) and (2).
Recall that a state of the ARBAC policy Γ is a structureM∈Mod(TARBAC ).
Definition 1. A configuration of Γ is a state M where M is a finite model,
i.e. the cardinality of the domain of M is bounded.
We are now in the position to define the pre-order on configurations.
Definition 2. Let M and M′ be configurations. We write M ≤ M′ iff there
exists an embedding s from M to M′.
B.4 From ∃-formulae to configurations...
We show that ∃-formulae identify configurations. To state this result formally,
we recall the following notation: [[K]] := {M ∈ Mod(TARBAC ) | M |= K}, for
K an ∃-formula.
Proposition 1. For every ∃-formula K, the set [[K]] is upward closed.
Proof. Since the union of an upward closed set is still an upward closed set, we
assume—without loss of generality—that K(ua) is of the form ∃r, u.ϕ(r, u, ua)
where u, r are tuples of variables for users and roles, respectively, and ϕ is a
conjunction of literals (as we can always transform a Boolean combination of
atoms into disjunctive normal form and then distribute the existential quantifiers
over the disjunction). Under these assumptions, showing that [[K]] is upward
closed amounts to prove that if the configuration M ∈ [[K]] and M≤ N , then
N ∈ [[K]], i.e. N |= K. Now, assume thatM∈ [[K]] andM≤ N . This implies,
by definition of [[·]], that (a) M |= K and (b) there exists an embedding s from
M to N . From (a), by definition of truth, it follows that there exist tuples eu
and er of sort User and Role, respectively, such that M |= K(eu, er). From (b)
and the definition of embedding, we derive that
M |= K(eu, er) iff N |= K(s(eu, er)).
The last two facts (and the well-known property that truth of quantifier-free
formulae is preserved when considering superstructures) imply that N |= K, as
desired. This concludes the proof that [[K]] is upward closed. uunionsq
We show that entailment between ∃-formulae is equivalent to containment among
configurations.
Proposition 2. [[K1]] ⊆ [[K2]] iff K1 ⇒ K2 is valid modulo TARBAC , for every
pair of ∃-formulae K1,K2,
Proof. There are two cases to consider. The ‘if’ case is trivial: it is an immediate
consequence of the definition of truth. For the ‘only if’ case, we prove that if
K1 ⇒ K2 is not valid modulo TARBAC , then [[K1]] 6⊆ [[K2]]. Assuming that
K1 ⇒ K2 is not valid modulo TARBAC is equivalent, by refutation, to say that
¬(K1 ⇒ K2) (or K1 ∧¬K2) is satisfiable modulo TARBAC . In turn, this implies
that K1 ∧ ¬K2 is satisfiable in a finite model according to the proof of the
decidability of the BSR class. From this and Proposition 1, we can derive that
[[K1]] ∩ [[K2]]c 6= ∅ (where ·c denotes the set complement operation). By simple
set-theoretic manipulations, we derive [[K1]] 6⊆ [[K2]], as desired. uunionsq
Lemma 1 is an immediate consequence of Propositions 1 and 2.
B.5 ... and viceversa: from configurations to ∃-formulae
We show that finitely generated upward closed sets of configurations are config-
urations of the form [[K]], for some ∃-formula K. To do this, we use Robinson
diagrams (introduced in Section B.2) since they give a logical formulation of
model theoretic properties such as “there exists an embedding from structure
M to structureN .” The importance of this is clear as soon as we recall the defini-
tion of pre-order over configurations that requires the existence of an embedding
among structures to show that a configuration precedes another according to
the pre-order. The main obstacle in using diagrams is that the formula δM(M)
usually contains infinitely many literals. Fortunately, in our case, it is possible
to show that we can consider only a finite sub-set of literals in δM(M) as all the
others are implied by those in the sub-set.
Proposition 3. The following facts hold:
(i) with every configurationM, it is possible to effectively associate an ∃-formula
KM (called diagram formula (for M)) such that [[KM]] =↑ M,
(ii) with every ∃-formula K, it is possible to effectively associate a finite set
{M1, ...,Mn} of configurations such that K is equivalent to
∨n
i=1KMi ,
(iii) any finitely generated upward closed set of configurations coincides with
[[K]], for some ∃-formula K.
Proof. We consider the three cases separately.
(i) Let M be a configuration and consider the “diagram” δM(eu, er) where eu
and er are finite tuples of users, roles, and permissions, respectively, that are
also in the domain of M.
Remark 1. Notice that δM(eu, er) is not the Robinson diagram as defined
above; however, it turns out to be equivalent to δM({eui | i ≥ 0} ∪ {eri | i ≥
0}), i.e. the “real” diagram. This is so because in any model of a BSR the-
ory, there are only finitely many distinct atoms that “matter,” which are
precisely those in δM(eu, er), because when checking for satisfiability we can
always restrict to those constants that occur in the formula to be checked for
satisfiability as discussed in the sketch of the proof of Property 2. (Recall,
in fact, that by applying Herbrand theorem, the Herbrand universe is finite
and composed only of the constants occurring in the formula.) So, below, we
refer to δM(eu, er) as the diagram and we treat it as the conjunction of its
elements (i.e. as a first-order formula) since it is finite. uunionsq
Now, take KM to be the following ∃-formula: ∃u, r.δM(u, r). We are left
with the problem of proving that [[KM]] =↑ M. By the definitions of
[[KM]] and ↑ M, this is equivalent to show that a configuration N is in
[[KM]], or—equivalently—N |= ∃u, r.δM(u, r) iff M ≤ N . Now, assume
N |= ∃u, r.δM(u, r), which is equivalent to N |= δM(eu, er). By the Dia-
gram Lemma (i.e. Lemma 2 above), this is equivalent to the existence of
an embedding from M to N , which—in turn—is equivalent to M≤ N , by
definition of ≤.
(ii) Without loss of generality, we can assume K to be ∃u, r.∨nk=1 ϕk(u, r). For
each k = 1, ..., n, we can also assume (again without loss of generality) that
there exists an existentially quantified variable x in u ∪ r such that x = t,
for each constant in K. In this way, all the elements are explicitly mentioned
in K. Now, in a BSR theory, every quantifier-free formula with at most m
free variables is equivalent to a disjunction of the diagram δM(X) where
M is a substructure of a model in the theory and X is a set of elements of
cardinality at most m. Thus, K can be rewritten as∨
A
∃u, r.δA(u, r)
for A ranging over the models whose cardinality is m (recall that the class
of models of a BSR theory is closed under substructures). Each disjunct
can be unsatisfiable, because it does not agree with the interpretation of
ua, or satisfiable and, in this case, the model A is a configuration such that
∃u, r.δA(u, r) is precisely KA, as desired.
(iii) An immediate corollary of (i) and (ii) above. uunionsq
The results in this and the previous subsection tells us that ∃-formulae and
configurations can be used interchangeably.
B.6 Proof of termination of backward reachability
Theorem 1. The backward reachability procedure in Figure 1 terminates.
Proof. First of all, notice that when the algorithm return reachable, it also ter-
minates (line 3). So, we consider the case when the goal is unreachable. Let
B(τ,K) :=
⋃
i≥0[[BR
i(τ,K)]]. There two cases to consider.
– Let K be the ∃-formula given in input to the algorithm and assume that
B(τ,K) is finitely generated (that B(τ,K) is an upward closed set is obvious
because it is obtained as union of upward closed sets since [[K]] is so by
Proposition 1). Because of Proposition 2, we have that
[[BR0(τ,K)]] ⊆ [[BR2(τ,K)]] ⊆ · · · ⊆ [[BRn(τ,K)]] ⊆ [[BRn+1(τ,K)]] ⊆ · · ·
Because B(τ,K) is finitely generated, we have that there exists n such that
[[BRn(τ,K)]] = [[BRn+1(τ,K)]] and, again by Proposition 2, we derive
that BRn(τ,K)⇔ BRn+1(τ,K) is valid modulo TARBAC , i.e. the algorithm
halts.
– Assume that the algorithm terminates. By Proposition 2, this is equivalent
to BRn(τ,K) ⇔ BRn+1(τ,K) is valid modulo TARBAC which, by Propo-
sition 2, is equivalent to [[BRn(τ,K)]] = [[BRn+1(τ,K)]], for some n ≥ 0.
Notice that B(τ,K) = [[BRn(τ,K)]] is finitely generated by Proposition 3.
So far, we have proved that the backward reachability procedure in Figure 1
terminates iff B(τ,K) is finitely generated. Thus, to conclude the proof, we show
that B(τ,K) is indeed finitely generated. To this end, if we are able to prove
that the pre-order on configurations is a wqo, then are entitled to conclude that
B(τ,K) is finitely generated (recall the definition of wqo in Section B.1). Now,
the pre-order on configurations is a wqo by Dickson’s Lemma [12]. In fact, a
configuration is uniquely determined by a pair of integers counting the number
of pairs (u, r) for which ua(u, r) holds and the configuration ordering is obtained
by component-wise comparison. This concludes the proof. uunionsq
Combining the results above, we derive the main result of this paper, i.e. Theo-
rem 2.
C Decidability of related security analysis problems
Here we consider three security analysis problems which are related to user-role
reachability and discuss their decidability.
Inductive policy invariants. In [9, 8], the problem of checking properties that
remain unaffected under any sequence of actions of arbitrary (but finite) length
is considered. This is the dual problem of user-role reachability; in fact, it is
not difficult to prove that if the backward reachability procedure terminates
(with unreachable), then the fix-point is the strongest invariant. More precisely,
In other words, a policy invariant is a formula which holds in every state of an
ARBAC policy. In our framework, the problem of checking whether a property
is an inductive invariant (a particular case of a policy invariant) turns out to
be decidable because of Property 2. Let Γ := (In, {τi}, {ιj}) be a symbolic AR-
BAC policy. The ∀-formula ψ(ua) is an inductive (policy) invariant for Γ iff (a)
In(ua)⇒ ψ(ua) is valid modulo TARBAC and (b) (ι(ua)∧ψ(ua)∧τ(ua, ua′))⇒
ψ(ua′) is valid modulo TARBAC . It is easy to see that (a) and (b) can be reduced
to the satisfiability of BSR formulae. In fact, (a) is equivalent to the unsatisfia-
bility modulo TARBAC of In(ua)∧¬ψ(ua), which—in turn—can be transformed
to a formula of BSR. Similarly, (b) is equivalent to the unsatisfiability modulo
TARBAC of ι(ua)∧ψ(ua)∧τ(ua, ua′)∧¬ψ(ua′) which is again logically equivalent
to a BSR formula. These observations with Property 2 imply the following fact.
Theorem 3. The problem of establishing if a ∀-formula is an inductive policy
invariant is decidable.
Indeed, checking inductive invariants is a lot cheaper than running the backward
reachability procedure. The drawback is that if a property ψ fails to be an
inductive invariant, then we cannot conclude about its being an invariant of Γ
(in other words, inductive invariants are a strict sub-class of policy invariants).
However, we can take the complement ¬ψ (which is an ∃-formula) of ψ and run
the backward reachability procedure. If this returns unreachable, then we can
conclude that ψ is an invariant of Γ .
Role containment. The problem of role containment for a symbolic ARBAC
policy Γ consists of checking if every member of a certain role, say er1, is also
member of another role, say er2, in every state reachable from the initial state.
For simplicity, assume there is no role hierarchy. It is easy to reduce this to the
user-role reachability problem by considering a role erk not occurring in Γ and
the following can assign action:
∃u, r, r1.
(
ua(u, r) ∧ r = er1 ∧ ¬ua(u1, r1) ∧ r1 = er2 ∧ ua′ = ua⊕ (u, erk)
)
.
Let Γ ′ be obtained by adding the action above to Γ . It is easy to see that the
role containment problem for Γ is solvable iff role erk is reachable by Γ
′.
Weakest precondition. The weakest precondition problem for a transition system
Γ and goal γ consists of computing the minimal sets of initial role memberships
of a given user euk for which γ is reachable. This can be reduced to the user-role
reachability problem by taking ∀u, r.¬ua(u, r) as the initial state formula In and
then using a refinement of the backward reachability procedure in Figure 1. The
refinement consists of using ∃-formulae whose matrix is a conjunction of literals
only; this is without loss of generality as any ∃-formula can be transformed to a
finite disjunction of ∃-formulae whose matrices are conjunctions of literals, called
∃+-formulae, by simple logical manipulations, and representing the search space
by a forest of trees whose nodes are labelled by ∃+-formulae.
The root nodes are labelled by the ∃+-formulae whose disjunction is equiv-
alent to the goal γ. Then, we iteratively extend each tree by selecting a node
with no sons by adding as many sons as the number of ∃+-formulae which are
equivalent to the pre-image of the formula labelling the father node. After the
creation of a node n, we check whether a fix-point has been reached as follows.
First, we consider the formula ψ labelling node n. Second, we take the disjunc-
tion of the ∃+-formulae labelling all the nodes in the tree except ψ: it is not
difficult to see that this is equivalent to the content of the variable B of the
procedure in Figure 1, i.e. it is the set of backward reachable states. Third, we
check the satisfiability of ¬((ι∧ ψ)⇒ B), which is similar to the check at line 2
in Figure 1 except that ψ is an ∃+-formula instead of an ∃-formula. Because the
pre-order on configurations is a wqo, it is possible to show that this procedure
always terminates with finitely many trees. At this point, we collect all the ∃+-
formulae labelling the nodes of the trees in the forest, compute the corresponding
configurations (this is always possible because of Lemma 1, and take only those
sets where the interpretation of ua has the minimal number of occurrences of
the user euk as the first component. Since all the computation are effective, the
procedure terminates.
By these reductions, we obtain the decidability of these two security analysis
problems.
Theorem 4. The containment and weakest precondition problems are decidable.
D A worked-out example
We consider a simple reachability problem in [23]. There are several simplifying
assumptions made by the authors of [23] that allow us to: (i) ignore permissions
and focus only on roles, (ii) the role hierarchy can be abstracted away, (iii) there
is just one administrative role and user capable of executing an administrative
action of assignment, and (iv) there exists just one user to which administrative
actions can be applied. As a consequence, a can assign action can be seen as
pair 〈C, r′〉 (where the administrative role has been omitted) while a ‘can revoke
action only identifies the role r′ to be revoked and ignore the administrative role
that is supposed to apply the action, hence its specification will simply be 〈r′〉.
Under these assumptions, the ARBAC policy considered in [23] consists of the
following can assign actions:
can assign1 : 〈{er1}, er2〉,
can assign2 : 〈{er2}, er3〉,
can assign3 : 〈{er2}, er3〉,
can assign4 : 〈{er3, er4}, er5〉,
can assign5 : 〈{er5}, er6〉,
can assign6 : 〈{er2}, er7〉,
can assign7 : 〈{er7}, er8〉,
where we have dropped the numerical subscript of the constant eu denoting a
user because of assumption (iv); and the following ‘can revoke actions:
can revoke1 : 〈r1〉,
can revoke2 : 〈r2〉,
can revoke3 : 〈r3〉,
can revoke4 : 〈r5〉,
can revoke5 : 〈r6〉,
can revoke6 : 〈r7〉.
The initial state s0 of the ARBAC system is the following:
s0(ua) := {(eu, er1), (eu, er4), (eu, er7)},
and the goal is to reach a state where the user eu can be assigned to role er6. As
said in [23], the goal is not reachable from the initial state. Below, we explain how
to show that this is indeed the case in our framework and using the backward
reachability procedure in Figure 1.
First of all, we specify the theory TARBAC := TRole∪TUser ∪TPermission ∪PA
as follows:
TRole := SV ({er1, ..., er8},Role)
TUser := SV ({eu},User)
TPermission := ∅
PA := ∅.
The formula In(ua) characterizing the set of initial states is expressed by
∀u, r.(ua(u, r)⇔
 (u = eu ∧ r = er1) ∨(u = eu ∧ r = er4) ∨
(u = eu ∧ r = er7)
 .
The goal formula γ(ua) characterizing the set of goal states is expressed by
∃u, r.(ua(u, r) ∧ u = eu ∧ r = er6).
Notice that because of assumption (ii), the restricted form of negation allowed in
the preconditions of transitions of the form (1) is sufficient to precisely describe
the ‘can assign actions above:
can assign1 : ∃u, r.(ua(u, r) ∧ r = er1 ∧ ua′ = ua⊕ (u, er2)
can assign2 : ∃u, r.(ua(u, r) ∧ r = er2 ∧ ua′ = ua⊕ (u, er3)
can assign3 : ∃u, r, r1.
(
ua(u, r) ∧ r = er3 ∧ ¬ua(u, r1) ∧ r1 = er4∧
ua′ = ua⊕ (u, er5)
)
can assign4 : ∃u, r.(ua(u, r) ∧ r = er5 ∧ ua′ = ua⊕ (u, er6)
can assign5 : ∃u, r.(¬ua(u, r) ∧ r = er2 ∧ ua′ = ua⊕ (u, er7)
can assign6 : ∃u, r.(ua(u, r) ∧ r = er7 ∧ ua′ = ua⊕ (u, er8).
The can revoke actions can be expressed as follows:
can revoke1 : ∃u.(ua′ = ua	 (u, er1))
can revoke2 : ∃u.(ua′ = ua	 (u, er2))
can revoke3 : ∃u.(ua′ = ua	 (u, er3))
can revoke4 : ∃u.(ua′ = ua	 (u, er5))
can revoke5 : ∃u.(ua′ = ua	 (u, er6))
can revoke6 : ∃u.(ua′ = ua	 (u, er7)).
Now, we can explain how the backward reachability procedure works on the
example. In order to simplify the presentation, in the following, we use a vari-
ant of the backward reachability procedure in Figure 1. The differences are the
following. First, instead of considering the disjunction of all the possible actions
and compute the pre-images of the goal with respect to this complex formula, we
consider the pre-images of the goal with respect each possible action separately.
Indeed, this allows us to write more compact formulae and, since it is easy to
see that pre-image computation distributes over disjunction, it is sufficient to
take the disjunction of the pre-images computed with respect to a single action
to obtain the same formula computed by the procedure in Figure 1. Concern-
ing the satisfiability checks, while the reachability test can be done as soon as
we obtain a (satisfiable) pre-image with respect to a single action, the fix-point
check requires a bit of care. In fact, after obtaining a (satisfiable) pre-image,
the fix-point is local to that pre-image in the sense that all the (satisfiable) pre-
images with respect to the remaining actions must also be checked for fix-point.
Hence, a global fix-point is reached only when all the local fix-point are suc-
cessful. Furthermore, each local fix-point check must be done by conjoining the
actual pre-image with conjunction of the negation of each pre-image previously
computed. It is not difficult to see that the global fix-point corresponds to the
fix-point check of the procedure in Figure 1.
First of all, the backward procedures computes the pre-image of γ with re-
spect to each can assign and can revoke actions. To illustrate how one of the
pre-image computation is done, let us consider Pre(can assign4, γ), i.e.
∃u1, r1.(ua′(u1, r1) ∧ u1 = eu ∧ r1 = er6) ∧
∃u2, r2.(ua(u2, r2) ∧ u2 = eu ∧ r2 = er5 ∧ ua′ = ua⊕ (u2, er6)
where variables have been renamed to disambiguate the scope of applications
of the existential quantifiers and ua′ is implicitly existentially quantified. The
formula can be rewritten as follows:
∃u1, r1, u2, r2.
ua′(u1, r1) ∧ u1 = eu ∧ r1 = er6)∧ua(u2, r2) ∧ u2 = eu ∧ r2 = er5∧
ua′ = λw, r.(if (w = u2 ∧ r = er6) then true else ua(w, r))

by simple logical manipulations and recalling the definition of ⊕. Then, substi-
tuting the λ-expression we derive:
∃u1, r1, u2, r2.
λw, r.(if (w = u2 ∧ r = er6) then true else ua(w, r))(u1, r1)∧u1 = eu ∧ r1 = er6) ∧ ua(u2, r2) ∧ u2 = eu ∧ r2 = er5∧
ua′ = λw, r.(if (w = u2 ∧ r = er6) then true else ua(w, r))

which can be furtherly simplified as follows by using β-reduction:
∃u1, r1, u2, r2.
 (if (u1 = u2 ∧ r1 = er6) then true else ua(u1, r1))∧u1 = eu ∧ r1 = er6) ∧ ua(u2, r2) ∧ u2 = eu ∧ r2 = er5∧
ua′ = λw, r.(if (w = u2 ∧ r = er6) then true else ua(w, r))
 .
Now, we observe that u1 = u2 is valid modulo TARBAC since TUser constrains
the set of users to be the singleton set {eu} and that r1 = er6 holds because it
occurs in the formula above. Hence, we can simplify the formula above as follows:
∃u1, r1, u2, r2.(u1 = eu ∧ r1 = er6) ∧ ua(u2, r2) ∧ u2 = eu ∧ r2 = er5)
where ua′ has been dropped since the equality ua′ = λw, r.(· · ·) is easily seen to
be always satisfiable (this is so because to make the equality true, it is sufficient
to take ua′ equal to the λ-expression on the right) . Finally, simple considerations
on the quantified variables allow us to simplify the last formula even further so
as to obtain:
∃u, r.(ua(u, r) ∧ u = eu ∧ r = er5),
whose matrix is a policy constraint, exactly as the matrix of γ. This is not an
accident as it is possible to show that that the class of existentially quantified
formulae whose matrix is a policy constraint are closed under pre-image compu-
tation. Let B0 be γ and B1 be the last formula above. The backward procedure
performs a satisfiability check of the conjunction between In and B1, i.e. of the
following formula:
∀u, r.(ua(u, r)⇔
 (u = eu ∧ r = er1) ∨(u = eu ∧ r = er4) ∨
(u = eu ∧ r = er7)
) ∧ ∃u, r.(ua(u, r) ∧
u = eu ∧ r = er5
)
so as to check whether the goal has been reached. Skolemizing the two existen-
tially quantified variables, we obtain:
∀u, r.(ua(u, r)⇔
 (u = eu ∧ r = er1) ∨(u = eu ∧ r = er4) ∨
(u = eu ∧ r = er7)
) ∧ (ua(u˜, r˜) ∧
u˜ = eu ∧ r˜ = er5
)
,
where r˜ and u˜ are fresh constants. Now, observe that the universally quantified
variable u can only take one value as we have assumed that the set of users
contains just one element eu; hence it must be u˜ = eu. So, we are left with the
problem of instantiating the universally quantified variable r. The decidability
result of Property 2 allows us to consider only the instances of the formula where
u is instantiated to eu and r to r˜. It is not difficult to see that the resulting
formula is unsatisfiable, thus entitling us to conclude that the sets of states
characterized by B1 and In are disjoint and the goal state is not reachable by
applying can assign4.
Then, the backward procedure proceeds to check for a fix-point. This is equiv-
alent to the validity of B1 ⇒ B0 or to the unsatisfiability of its negation, namely
B1 ∧ ¬B0:
∃u, r.
(
ua(u, r) ∧
u = eu ∧ r = er5
)
∧ ∀u, r.¬(ua(u, r) ∧ u = eu ∧ r = er6).
As before, we Skolemize the existentially quantified variables so as to obtain the
following formula:(
ua(u˜, r˜) ∧
u˜ = eu ∧ r˜ = er5
)
∧ ∀u, r.¬(ua(u, r) ∧ u = eu ∧ r = er6).
where u˜, r˜ are fresh constants. As before, because of Property 2, without loss
of generality, we can restrict to consider the formula obtained by instantiating
u to eu and r to r˜: this time, however, we conclude that the formula is satisfi-
able. Thus, we have shown that a fix-point has not been reached and we need to
compute the pre-images of B1 w.r.t. the all the can assign and can revoke ac-
tions. However, before computing the pre-images of B1, we also need to compute
the pre-images of B0 w.r.t. τ in {can assigni|i = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6} ∪ {can revokei|i =
1, .., 6}, i.e. for the remaining assignments and revocations. This turns out to be
useless as all the formulae obtained in this way characterizes sets of states that
are sub-sets of those specified by γ or, in other words, we have reached a (lo-
cal) fix-point. For the sake of conciseness, we do not do this here. However, the
reader can verify this as a simple exercise by following the steps taken above for
computing Pre(can assign4, U) and checking for safety and fix-point. Similar ob-
servations hold also for the pre-images of B1: it turns out that all these formulae
implies B1, i.e. several (local) fix-point have been reached, and are unsatisfiable
when considered in conjunction with In, i.e. they pass the safety check. As a
consequence, we can conclude that we have reached a (global) fix-point and the
goal is not reachable.
